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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. When a check is tendered on condition that negotiation of 
it will constitute full satisfaction of an unliquidated claim, 
does the negotiation of the check with knowledge of the condition 
create an accord and satisfaction, even though the payee does not 
subjectively intend to assent to the condition? 
2. Does the Court of Appeals opinion conflict with the 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 
706 P. 2d 607 (Utah 1985)? 
3. Does the Court of Appeals opinion conflict with the 
decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals, in Cove View 
Excavating and Construction Co, v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 
1988)? 
4. Does the Court of Appeals decision so far depart from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or does it so 
far sanction such a departure by the trial court, as to call for 
an exercise of this Court's power of supervision? 
REFERENCE TO REPORT OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals opinion is reported at 1990 WL 69055.1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court of Appeals filed its opinion May 24, 1990. No 
petition for rehearing was filed, nor was any order entered 
extending the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. 
1
 This Petition will refer to the slip opinion of the Court 
of Appeals, attached as Appendix A. 
1 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of 
the Court of Appeals under the authority of Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5), and Rules 42-48 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES, ETC. 
There are no controlling provisions of constitutions, 
statutes, ordinances, or regulations in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is a civil action for collection of money for snow 
removal services rendered under a written contract. 
2. Course of the Proceedings 
Estate Landscape and Snow Removal, Inc. ("Estate") filed its 
complaint on August 8, 1985, praying for damages of $30,162.50 (R. 
2). Estate filed an Amended Complaint on May 16, 1986, praying 
for damages of $21,549.50 (R. 24). On July 31, 1986, The Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell") filed a 
motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of 
accord and satisfaction (R. 45), which the Court (Judge Michael 
Murphy presiding) denied in a Summary Decision and Order filed 
December 29, 1986 (R. 127). The case was tried to the Court 
(Judge Timothy Hanson presiding) on January 12 and 13, 1988. 
3. Disposition in the Lower Courts 
On April 1, 1988, the trial court entered judgment for 
Estate. Mountain Bell appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 
2 
24, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the 
principal, but remanded for amendment of the judgment to exclude 
compounded interest. 
4. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Estate and Mountain Bell entered into a written agreement 
wherein Estate agreed to perform snow removal services for 
Mountain Bell at specified rates, including the removal of snow at 
Mountain Bell's central office in Alta, Utah "when the snow 
reaches four inches." (Exhibit 3) 
Between December 28, 1984 and April 1, 1985, Estate performed 
snow removal services at Mountain Bell's Alta office. At the 
close of the snow season, Estate sent Mountain Bell an itemized 
final bill for $30,162.50, representing services rendered at the 
Alta site during that period. (Exhibit 4) Mountain Bell disputed 
the bill as excessive, principally because it contained charges 
for snow removal on days when less than four inches of snowfall 
was reported.2 On about June 14, 1985, Mountain Bell prepared a 
letter to Estate detailing the portions of the bill that it 
disputed.3 (Exhibit 6) The letter concluded: 
Based on the above identified billing descrepancies [sic] we 
have enclosed a check for $8613.00 which is payment in full 
for satisfaction of contracted services. If you are not 
willing to accept that sum, $8613.00 in full satisfaction of 
2
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 37-43. Because there were 
several reporters at various times during the trial, the 
transcript is not paginated consecutively. Therefore, it will be 
referred to in this Petition by date, and where necessary, by the 
name of the reporter. 
3
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 42-44. 
3 
the sums due, DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your 
negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter as fully 
paid. 
(emphasis in original) 
Mountain Bell's bill payment supervisor held the letter 
pending delivery of a check for $8,613.004 from Mountain Bell's 
accounting department for enclosure with the letter.5 However, on 
or about June 21, 1985, rather than delivering the check to the 
person holding the letter, Mountain Bell's accounting department 
mailed the check directly to Estate.6 Upon discovering that the 
check had been sent separately, Mountain Bell's bill payment 
supervisor sent the letter without enclosing a check, on about 
June 28, 1985.7 Because it was sent by certified mail, it was not 
received until August 5, 1985.8 At the time Estate received 
Mountain Bell's letter, it had not negotiated the check.9 Estate 
knew that the $8,613.00 check that it had received earlier was the 
check referred to in Mountain Bell's letter of June 14, 1985.10 
4
 $8,613.00 represented the difference between the amount of 
the bill and the charges that Mountain Bell disputed. 
5
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 45. 
6
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 44-46. 
7
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 45; Smith Transcript of Jan. 
13 at 5. 
8
 Transcript of Jan. 12 at 11-12. 
9
 Exhibit 8; Response to Defendant's Second Set of Requests 
for Admissions #7, R. at 101. 
1 0
 Response to Defendant's Second Set of Requests for 
Admissions #8, R. at 101; Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 24-25. 
Smith Transcript of Jan. 13 at 12. 
On August 8, 1985, Estate filed suit to recover the entire 
amount of its bill, $30,162.50. (R. 2) It did not cash the 
$8,613.00 check until on or about October 28, 1985, when the check 
was negotiated and deposited for collection.11 Estate later 
amended its complaint to claim $21,549.50. (R. 24) 
On about July 31, 1986, Mountain Bell filed a motion for 
summary judgment, asserting that Estate's negotiation of the check 
for $8,613.00, with knowledge that it was offered in full 
satisfaction of Mountain Bell's obligation to Estate, constituted 
an accord and satisfaction. (R. 45) Judge Murphy denied the 
motion in a Summary Decision and Order, (R. 127)12 and the case 
later went to trial before Judge Hanson. In denying Mountain 
Bell's affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, Judge 
Hanson (the trial judge) relied heavily on Judge Murphy's Summary 
Decision denying Mountain Bell's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, stating that he considered that ruling to be the law of 
the case.13 No finding of fact was made to support the denial of 
the accord and satisfaction defense. (R. 270) 
Neither Judge Murphy nor Judge Hansen ever characterized the 
denial of Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment as being a 
ruling on the merits of the accord and satisfaction defense, 
1 1
 Exhibit 8; Response to Defendant's Second Set of Requests 
for Admissions #9, R. at 101. 
12
 The Summary Decision and Order is attached hereto as 
Appendix D. 
13
 Transcript of Jan. 15 at 3-4. 
5 
precluding the introduction of evidence on that issue at the 
trial; in fact, considerable evidence on that issue was introduced 
at the trial. No order was ever entered granting Estate summary 
judgment on that issue. However, the Court of Appeals treated 
Judge Murphy's denial of Mountain Bell's motion as having the 
effect of a ruling on the merits, or a summary judgment in 
Estate's favor on the accord and satisfaction defense. (Slip Op. 
at 4-6) In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
judgment except for the award of compounded interest, and remanded 
to the trial court for amendment of the judgment in that respect. 
(Slip Op. at 8-9) Judge Jackson filed a dissenting opinion. 
(Slip Op. at 10-11) 
ARGUMENT 
NEGOTIATION OF A CHECK OFFERED IN FULL SETTLEMENT OF AN 
UNLIQUIDATED CLAIM CREATES AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION, 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PAYEE'S SUBJECTIVE INTENTION TO THE 
CONTRARY. 
The Court of Appeals' principal error was its holding that 
even though Estate negotiated Mountain Bell's check knowing that 
it was offered in full satisfaction of the disputed claim, "the 
mutual assent for the would-be accord is lacking." (Slip Op. at 
7) The Court elaborated: 
[T]here is no indication that Estate Landscape assented to 
the letter as an accord. Its signature on the check is not 
an assent to an accord not found on the face of the check as 
a restrictive endorsement, where the party to whom the accord 
is offered has expressly rejected the proposed accord, 
continued the dispute, and filed litigation to resolve it 
adversarially in court. 
(Id., footnote omitted) 
6 
Later in the majority opinion, the Court acknowledged: 
It would, perhaps, be possible to offer an accord and provide 
in the offer that cashing an accompanying check would be 
acceptance of the offer, since the offeror can, within 
reason, specify the act that shall constitute acceptance. 
(Slip Op. at 8; footnote omitted). However, the Court failed to 
conclude that precisely such a circumstance existed in this case. 
Rather, the Court stated, "However, the offeree can also reject 
the offer, after which there is nothing left to accept." (Id.) 
The Court then concluded that because Estate had "rejected" 
Mountain Bell's offer of an accord, it was thereafter free (and 
perhaps even duty-bound) to negotiate the check as a partial 
payment, without risking a finding of accord and satisfaction. 
(Id.) 
In essence, the Court of Appeals has held that subjective, 
mutual assent is a condition precedent for accord and 
satisfaction, and that assent may not be inferred as a matter of 
law from the negotiation of a check offered in full satisfaction 
of a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated claim. This analysis 
is directly contrary to Utah law as expressed in Marton Remodeling 
v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985) and Cove View Excavating and 
Construction Co. v. Flynn. 758 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988). 
In Marton, the plaintiff remodeled defendant's home under a 
"time and materials" contract. The parties disagreed on the 
proper charges for the work (defendant asserting, as in the case 
at bar, that the number of hours claimed was excessive). 
Defendant sent plaintiff a check with the notation: 
7 
Endorsement hereof constitutes full and final satisfaction of 
any and all claims payee may have against [defendant] or his 
property, arising from any circumstances existing on the date 
hereof. 
706 P.2d at 608. The plaintiff wrote defendant a letter refusing 
to accept the check in full payment and demanding the balance. 
When defendant did not pay, plaintiff wrote ''not full payment" on 
the check, then cashed it and sued for the balance. Under those 
circumstances, the plaintiff obviously did not subjectively assent 
to the check as full payment. Nevertheless, this Court held that 
the negotiation of the check created an accord and satisfaction: 
[W]hen a bona fide dispute arises . . . and a check is 
tendered in full payment of an unliquidated claim . . . 
arising out of a "time and materials" contract, the creditor 
may not disregard the condition attached. Corbin on 
Contracts § 1279 explains: 
The fact that the creditor scratches out the words "in 
full payment," or other similar words indicating that 
the payment is tendered in full satisfaction, does not 
prevent his retention of the money from operating as an 
assent to the discharge. The creditor's action in such 
case is quite inconsistent with his words. It may, 
indeed, be clear that he does not in fact assent to the 
offer made by the debtor, so that there is no actual 
"meeting of the minds." But this is merely another 
illustration of the fact that the making of a contract 
frequently does not reguire such an actual meeting. 
706 P.2d at 609 (emphasis added). Apropos to the case at bar, 
this Court then quoted with approval an illustration from the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281: 
6. A contracts with B to have repairs made on A's house, no 
price being fixed. B sends A a bill for $1,000. A honestly 
disputes this amount and sends a letter explaining that he 
thinks the amount excessive and is enclosing a check for $800 
as payment in full. B, after reading the letter, indorses 
the check and deposits it in his bank for collection. B is 
bound by an accord under which he promises to accept payment 
of the check in satisfaction of A's debt for repairs. The 
8 
result is the same if, before indorsing the check, B adds the 
words "Accepted under protest as part payment." The result 
would be different, however, if B's claim were liquidated, 
undisputed and matured. 
706 P.2d at 609-10 (emphasis added) This Court then cited further 
cases14 for the proposition that 
a creditor cannot avoid the consequences of his exercise of 
dominion by a declaration that he does not assent to the 
condition attached by the debtor. The last cited case 
succinctly stated the law to be, "The law gave the plaintiffs 
the choice of accepting the check on defendant's terms or of 
returning it." 
706 P.2d at 610 (emphasis added). Finally, this Court quoted with 
approval the following statement from Pillow v. Thermoaas Company 
of Walnut Ridge. 6 Ark. App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982): 
If we were to decide that a creditor can reserve his rights 
on a "payment in full" check, it would seriously circumvent 
what has been universally accepted in the business community 
as a convenient means for the resolution of disagreements. 
706 P.2d at 610. 
The holding and analysis of Marton correctly state the law of 
Utah and of the vast majority of other jurisdictions. See 
generally. Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Acceptance of 
Check Purporting to be Final Settlement of Disputed Amount 
Constitutes Accord and Satisfaction. 42 A.L.R. 4th 12 (1985). 
More importantly to this petition, Marton directly contradicts the 
Court of Appeals7 analysis in this case, which erroneously 
concluded that subjective, mutual assent is necessary to an accord 
and satisfaction, and that a creditor may reject the condition 
14
 Miller v. Prince Street Elevator Co.. 41 N.M. 330, 68 P.2d 
663 (1937); Wilmeth v. Lee. 316 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1957); Graffam v. 
Geronda, 304 A.2d 76 (Me. 1973). 
9 
attached to a "full satisfaction" check, and cash it with 
impunity. The Court of Appeals' decision cannot be reconciled 
with, and must therefore yield to, the rule of law stated in 
Marton. 
In Cove View Excavating and Construction Co. v. Flvnn, 758 
P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988), the defendant disputed plaintiffs 
charges for construction equipment rental under a contract that 
specified rates, but not a specific term. The defendant sent 
plaintiff a check with the notation on the front of the check: 
"pmt in full to date labor & materials," and a further notation on 
the back of the check: "payment in full for all labor and 
materials to 6/26/84." On the advice of counsel, the defendant 
crossed out the restrictive language on the back of the check and 
negotiated it, then sued for the balance. 
The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, 
holding that the negotiation of the check created an accord and 
satisfaction, "notwithstanding [plaintiff's] actual intent." 758 
P.2d at 477. The Court further stated: 
In light of the express condition on the check, the fact that 
Grundy did not subjectively intend to accept the check as 
full payment of Flynn's obligation is legally irrelevant. A 
creditor may not disregard the condition attached to a check 
tendered in full payment of an unliquidated or disputed 
claim, [citing Marton] Grundy's options were to accept the 
check on Flynn's terms or return it. [citing cases] His 
negotiation of Flvnn's check was an acceptance of Flynn's 
offer of full payment, notwithstanding his lack of any actual 
intent to accept it as such. 
758 P.2d at 478 (emphasis added). 
10 
It is obvious that the rule announced in Cove View, which 
followed Marton, is incompatible with the Court of Appeals7 ruling 
in this case. The majority of the Court of Appeals misapplied the 
concept of mutual assent, requiring actual intent to accept an 
offer of accord, whereas the law infers mutual assent and 
acceptance from the act of negotiating a full payment check withT 
knowledge of the condition, regardless of the payee's actual 
intent or efforts to avoid the condition.15 For this reason, the 
petition for certiorari must be granted to avoid an irreconcilable 
1 5
 See also, Flaael v. Southwest Clinical Phvsiatrists, P.C., 
157 Ariz. 196, 755 P.2d 1184, 1190 (1988)("[Defendant] clearly 
expressed its intent that the check was paid as a settlement in 
full. It may be that [plaintiff] did not assent and there was no 
actual meeting of the minds. However, the making of a contract in 
this circumstance does not require such an actual meeting of the 
minds. As a matter of law, an accord and satisfaction occurred 
when [plaintiff] cashed the check."); Air Van Lines, Inc. v. 
Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 779 (Alaska 1983)("[R]egardless of 
[plaintiff's] intentions, a purported reservation of rights is 
ineffective when a clearly conditional tender is accepted."); Van 
Riper v. Baker, 61 Or. App. 540, 658 P.2d 537, 539 (1983)("It is 
well settled that 'one who accepts and cashes a check which 
purports by notation or by the terms upon which it was tendered to 
be in full satisfaction of a disputed claim between the parties 
has accepted the payment on those terms.7 . . . . This rule 
applies even when the amount tendered is no greater than the 
debtor admits he owes . . . or when the creditor does not intend 
that his act of cashing the check constitute an acceptance . . . 
or when the creditor asserts to the debtor that the check is 
received only in part payment."); Welbourne & Purdv, Inc. v. 
Mahon, 54 A.D.2d 1046, 388 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (1976)("[N]either the 
[plaintiff's] representative's declarations nor the [plaintiff's] 
manager's protest in suing for the balance can change the rule 
that '[w]hat is said is overridden by what is done, and assent is 
imputed as an inference of law'."); Miller v. Prince Street 
Elevator Co.. 68 P.2d 663, 665 (1937)("When the appellee accepted 
and cashed such check and appropriated unto himself the proceeds 
thereof, well knowing that such payment was burdened with such 
condition, he thereby accepted it as tendered. He could not 
accept the benefit of such tender without likewise accepting its 
condition."). 
11 
conflict with prior cases decided both by this Court and by 
another panel of the Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £/( day of June, 1990. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
BY_ 
'loyd^k. Jensen, Attorney 
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A. Estate Landscape and Snov Removal Specialists, Inc. v. The 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company» No. 880428 
CAf slip op. (Utah App., filed May 24f 1990) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ™h*( -• ^ . 
ooOoo 
Estate Landscape and Snow 
Removal Specialists, Inc., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION Y^J 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880428-CA 
Salt Lake County, Third District, 
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy and Timothy R. Hanson. 
Attorneys: Floyd A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
David D. Loreman and Lowell V. Summerhays, Murray, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Larson.l 
LARSON, Judge: 
This is an action seeking to collect amounts alleged to be 
due under a contract for snow removal services rendered by Estate 
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. (Estate Landscape). 
Defendant Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(Mountain Bell) appeals from a judgment in favor of Estate 
Landscape. 
Estate Landscape and Mountain Bell entered into a written 
contract which provided that Estate Landscape would remove snow 
from certain buildings occupied by Mountain Bell in return for 
payment at a specified rate. Estate Landscape performed its work 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(Supp. 1989). 
suitably, and billed Mountain Bell twice, once for work through 
December 27 and again at the end of the snow season.2 The 
billing separately listed each snow removal item by date. 
Mountain Bell paid the first bill, but considered the 
$30,162.90 total of the second bill to be excessive for the 
services at its Alta office. It therefore sent Estate 
Landscape a check for only $8,613. The check did not contain a 
restrictive endorsement or a waiver on its face. Upon receipt 
of the check, Estate Landscape responded by acknowledging 
partial payment and requesting the balance remaining, but 
Mountain Bell refused to pay the balance. Next, Mountain Bell 
sent Estate Landscape a letter^ explaining its position 
concerning the bill for the Alta office. According to the 
letter, the contract for the Alta office provided that Estate 
Landscape would remove snow when it reached a depth of four 
inches. From snowfall records for Alta, it appeared that 
Estate Landscape had billed for snow removal on days when the 
snowfall was less than four inches. On the basis of the 
snowfall records, therefore, Mountain Bell refused to pay for 
snow removal on certain days for which Estate Landscape had 
charged for its services. The letter specifically detailed all 
contested snow removal services by date. Mountain Bell's 
letter concluded: 
2. The contract required monthly statements, rather than a 
single statement at the end of the season. Mountain Bell 
claimed that Estate's failure to provide monthly billings was a 
breach, but the trial court found that the breach was not 
material, and thus, it did not excuse Mountain Bell from its 
obligations. See Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 
1982); Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water and 
Sewer Improvement Dist., 613 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980); 4 A. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 946 (1951). That finding is not 
contested on appeal. 
3. The check for $8,613 was to have been sent with the letter; 
however, Mountain Bell's accounting department mailed the check 
without the letter. Upon learning that the check had already 
been mailed, Mountain Bell sent its letter, which reached 
Estate Landscape before it cashed the check from Mountain 
Bell. Estate Landscape admits that it knew that the letter was 
in reference to the check it had received from Mountain Bell 
but had not as yet cashed. 
880428-CA 2 
Based on the above identified billing 
discrepancies we have enclosed!-4-! a 
check for $8613*00 which is payment in 
full for satisfaction of contracted 
services. If you are not willing to 
accept that sum, $8613.00 in full 
satisfaction of sums due, DO NOT negotiate 
the check, for upon vour negotiation of 
that check, we will treat the matter as 
fully paid. 
(Emphasis in original). 
When Estate Landscape received the letter, the check it had 
earlier received from Mountain Bell had not been cashed. 
Estate Landscape responded to Mountain Bell's letter by 
commencing this action against Mountain Bell. Initially, 
Estate Landscape complained for the entire $30,162.90 of its 
second bill for the winter of 1984-85. About two weeks after 
filing suit, Estate Landscape endorsed the check from Mountain 
Bell and cashed it, then amended its complaint against Mountain 
Bell to seek only the difference between the amount of the 
check and the amount billed. 
Mountain Bell moved for summary judgment on the grounds 
that its letter and check tendered to Estate Landscape were an 
accord and satisfaction of its obligation under the snow 
removal contract. The district court, per Judge Michael R. 
Murphy, denied the motion, noting that Mountain Bell admitted 
that it owed the amounts tendered in the check. The case 
proceeded to trial before the bench. 
At trial, Judge Timothy R. Hanson considered the earlier 
denial of summary judgment to have resolved the question of 
accord and satisfaction, and granted judgment to Estate 
Landscape for the amount of its bill, less certain charges for 
work not mentioned in the contract. The judgment included 
interest accruing before judgment, compounded annually. 
Mountain Bell appeals. 
4. Note that the check was not enclosed, but rather had 
erroneously been sent earlier. Estate Landscape admitted, 
however, that it recognized that the letter referred to the 
check it had earlier received from Mountain Bell. 
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Factual Standard of Review in Summary Judgment 
Mountain Bell now argues that the trial court erred in 
treating its motion for summary judgment as dispositive of its 
accord and satisfaction defense and thereafter refusing to 
reopen that issue at trial on the grounds that it was law of 
the case. Mountain Bell argues that the combined effect of the 
dispositive summary judgment and the refusal to try the issue 
was an unfairly skewed view of the facts in the district 
court. Mountain Bell argues that the court views the facts for 
summary judgment purposes in a light unfavorable to the moving 
party, and therefore, because the summary judgment was treated 
as conclusive against the movant, the movant here, Mountain 
Bell, never had a chance for a fair view of the facts on the 
issue. 
Mountain Bell, however, is not precisely correct in thus 
describing a court's factual viewpoint in deciding a motion for 
summary judgment. Although it may be true for most summary 
judgments that the court views the facts in favor of the 
nonmovant, that formulation takes into account only perhaps the 
most common outcomes of a motion for summary judgment, in which 
the moving party either receives the judgment it seeks, or all 
judgment is denied and the issue reserved for further 
consideration. However, in this case, Mountain Bell moved for 
summary judgment, and its motion was denied on the merits, and 
that denial effectively disposed of Mountain Bell's accord and 
satisfaction defense.5 Later, that disposition was regarded 
5. This course of action was not erroneous. See National 
Expositions v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 824 F.2d 131, 133 (1st 
Cir. 1987); British Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. First State 
Bank, 819 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.1987); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co., 734 F.2d 1402, 1408 (10th Cir. 
1984), reversed on other grounds, 472 U.S. 237 (1985); 
Giovanelli v. First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 120 Ariz. 577, 587 
P.2d 763, 768 (1978); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 at 29-35 (1983); 6 J. 
Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice If 56.12 
(1987). 
4 
as the law of the case, and the accord and satisfaction issue was 
not reopened.6 
Recognizing that the party adversely affected by the summary 
judgment has not had an opportunity for trial, the court views 
the facts in the light most favorable to that party.7 In 
situations in which summary judgment is granted, the party 
adversely affected would be the party who did not move for 
summary judgment. If summary judgment is denied on the merits 
and a claim or defense of the movant thereby eliminated, then the 
facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the moving 
party. Summary judgment may also be denied without reaching the 
merits of any claim or defense, often because the court cannot 
(Footnote 5 continued) 
In the absence of a cross-motion, the trial court should, on 
its own initiative, assure that the moving party has had a fair 
opportunity to address the grounds for the adverse judgment. See 
Bonilla v. Nazario, 843 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1988). A careful 
practitioner would therefore file a cross-motion in an 
appropriate case, to avoid concerns over the adequacy of the 
movant's opportunity to address all of the material issues. In 
this case, the district court, and this court as well, hold that 
Mountain Bell failed to carry its burden in establishing an 
accord. Mountain Bell bore in essence that same burden both in 
seeking summary judgment in its favor and in avoiding an adverse 
summary judgment. We therefore conclude that it had ample 
opportunity to establish an accord but has not succeeded in doing 
so. 
6. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Sittner v. Big 
Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); Salt 
.Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 
634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 
1125, 1129 (Utah 1989) (extraordinary intervening circumstances 
justifying reconsideration of a decided issue). 
7. See Branham v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989); 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah 1987); 
Lantz v. National Semiconductor Corp.. 775 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
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reconcile the material elements of the parties* versions of the 
facts, and thus cannot grant a summary judgment under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c)*8 Since any material difference in the parties' 
versions of the facts will preclude summary judgment, the 
shadings of light in which the facts are viewed cannot make a 
substantial difference in the result, even if the shading applied 
is erroneous. 
In this case, Mountain Bell was the movant for summary 
judgment on the accord and satisfaction issue. The district 
court's memorandum decision on Mountain Bell's motion was clearly 
intended to lay the defense of accord and satisfaction to rest. 
Since a defense of Mountain Bell's was thereby eliminated, the 
facts should be viewed in the light favorable to Mountain Bell. 
The record does not explicitly note whether the district court 
thus viewed the facts; however on appeal, we view the facts 
supporting a summary judgment through the same lens filter as the 
trial court.9 Therefore, since the issue of correctness of the 
summary judgment on its merits is before us, we proceed to review 
it in the light most favorable to Mountain Bell. 
Lack of an Accord 
In denying summary judgment on the merits, the district 
court reasoned that the contract for snow removal in this case 
was severable, and that the scope of the accord was therefore 
limited to only part of the contract. According to this 
8. Because a summary judgment motion can be denied for at least 
two reasons, either because judgment is not merited or because 
factual issues preclude a grant of summary judgment/ a trial 
court decision denying summary judgment should be expressed in a 
brief, written statement, identifying the grounds for denying 
summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). In part because of 
the tentatively slanted view on the facts, findings are not 
ordinarily made in resolving a motion for summary judgment, even 
if the motion is resolved on the merits. The main purpose of 
findings is to resolve material factual issues, Acton v. J.B. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987), and summary judgment cannot be 
granted if such issues exist. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Moreover, since the 
favorable factual viewpoint applied for summary judgment purposes 
is valid only for the motion at hand, the finality attributed to 
findings would perhaps tend to give too general a validity to a 
view of the facts that is entirely ad. hoc. 
9. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (1990). 
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reasoning, the accord and satisfaction did not fully discharge 
the contract.10 
Identifying which claim or claims are the subject of an 
accord and satisfaction depends on the manifested intent of the 
parties.11 However, before we can determine the contractual 
intent of the parties, we must have a contract. There is no 
contractual intent to be discovered where there has been no 
mutual assent. In this case, the mutual assent for the 
would-be accord is lacking.^ 
From Mountain Bell's point of view, the accord is 
contained essentially in its letter of June 14, 1985, to Estate 
Landscape. However, this letter is entirely unilateral; there 
is no indication that Estate Landscape assented to the letter 
as an accord. Its signature on the check is not an assent to 
an accord not found on the face of the check as a restrictive 
endorsement,^ where the party to whom the accord is offered 
has expressly rejected the proposed accord, continued the 
dispute, and filed litigation to resolve it adversarially in 
court. It is therefore apparent that an accord was offered, a 
check tendered in anticipation that an accord would be reached, 
10. See Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 
186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966); Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 
Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962); cf. Marton Remodeling v. 
Jensen, 706 P.2d 6097, 608-09 (Utah 1985); Allen-Howe 
Specialties v. U.S. Constr., Inc., 611 P.2d 705 (Utah 1980). 
While we recognize that Mountain Bell's letter may have had the 
effect of severing the contract, we do not reach that question, 
because, for lack of mutual assent, there was no contract to be 
severed. 
11. Ouealv v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah 1986) ("The 
scope of an accord and satisfaction is determined by the 
intention of the parties. . . . " ) ; see Petersen v. Petersen, 
709 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1985). 
12. We therefore affirm, but for a reason differing somewhat 
from the trial court's grounds for its decision. See Cox v. 
Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). 
13. C£. Cove View Excavating & Constr. Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 
474 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in which the acceptance of the accord 
was effected by negotiating a check bearing an assent to the 
accord on its face. 
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and a letter sent indicating what Mountain Bell intended and 
would do if the check were negotiated, but there is no 
indication of Estate Landscape's assent to the accord* Even in 
the light most favorable to Mountain Bell, the evidence simply 
falls short of demonstrating Estate Landscape's acceptance of 
Mountain Bell's offer to settle the account. It would, 
perhaps, be possible to offer an accord and provide in the 
offer that cashing an accompanying check would be acceptance of 
the offer, since the offeror can, within reason, specify the 
act that shall constitute acceptance.14 However, the offeree 
can also reject the offer, after which there is nothing left to 
accept. We believe that the telephone conference continuing 
the dispute and the filing of litigation amount to a rejection 
of the offered accord. After the litigation was underway, 
there remained the question of what to do with Mountain Bell's 
tendered check in Estate Landscape's possession. Estate 
Landscape acted within its rights in cashing check as payment 
of the portion of its claim that Mountain Bell agreed was 
owing; in fact, it may have had a duty so to act in order to 
properly mitigate its damages. Thus, even if we resolve any 
immaterial factual doubt in Mountain Bell's favor, this appears 
to be a situation in which one party asserts an accord to which 
the other party, for all that appears, never agreed. In such a 
case, accord and satisfaction is not a defense for lack of a 
binding accord. 
Compounding of Interest 
Mountain Bell's final argument is that, even if it is 
liable for the amount of the judgment, the interest on the 
judgment should not have been compounded. The general rule is 
that simple, not compound, interest accrues on a judgment, 
unless the parties contract otherwise,15 which they have not 
in this case, or unless the statute providing for interest on 
judgments expressly requires compounding, which ours does 
not.16 
14. Crane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 774 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
15. See Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 
551, 554-55 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (construing a note as not 
providing for compound interest). 
16. See Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1987); 47 C.J.S. Interest and 
Usury § 24 (1982). 
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This rule against compound interest on judgments is 
consistent with the general judicial disfavor of interest on 
interest.17 It is also of long standing and forms part of 
the backdrop against which the Legislature has statutorily 
provided for interest on judgments. We see no compelling 
reason to alter this longstanding gloss on the judgment 
interest statute.18 We therefore decline the invitation to 
engraft onto the statute judicial discretion to allow compound 
interest19 and reverse as to the award of compound interest. 
Except in regard to the interest provided in the judgment, 
the trial court's decision is affirmed. We vacate the 
provisions of the judgment relating to interest and remand for 
amendment of the judgment to provide for simple, rather than 
compound, interest. 
J^^/\^L^i^^ 
JohriMTarr L a r s o n , Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
17. Watkins & Faber v. Whitelev, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 
1979); Mountain States Broadcasting Co., 783 P.2d at 555. 
18. See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 
1283 (Utah 1987). 
19. See Stroud v. Stroud. 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988), aff'o 738 
P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
The decision and order on summary judgment was entered in 
this case on December 29, 1986. The order denied Mountain 
Bell's motion, which asserted the affirmative defense of accord 
and satisfaction. The motion judge, who did not have before 
him our recent decisions in Cove View Excavating and Constr. 
Co. v. Flvnn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Masonry 
Equipment & Supply v. Willco Assocs., Inc.. 755 P.2d 756 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), ruled that Hthis case is controlled by Marton 
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985)." But the 
springboard for the judge's legal analysis was that each 
separate day of work pursuant to the written contract 
constituted a separate claim. The court expressed 
'•[reluctance] to suggest that more than one claim exists in 
circumstances where the dispute arises under a single written 
contract," but felt compelled by Marton to do so. 
The motion judge stated, "In resolving this matter, the 
court cannot artificially bifurcate a single dispute in 
determining" whether there had been an accord and 
satisfaction. Contrary to that statement, the court did more 
than bifurcate the claim. The court treated the matter as one 
of multiple claims, i.e., each day's work was a claim. Thus, 
he considered the work on each of the thirty-one disputed days 
to support a separate claim for relief. I consider that 
premise untenable. 
While the lower court did not have the benefit of Cove 
View and Masonry Equipment, my colleagues do. They have 
nonetheless elected to completely ignore those opinions—as 
well as the lower court's reliance on Marton, a decision the 
majority opinion tucks away in a footnote—and engage in a 
"mutual assent" analysis. 
I would rely on Cove View, where, as in this case, the 
parties simply disagreed over the total amount to be paid on a 
contract. The $8,613 check was tendered by Mountain Bell with 
the following condition attached, with the emphasis in the 
original: 
Based on the above identified billing 
discrepancies [sic] we have enclosed a check 
for.$8613.00 which is payment in full for 
satisfaction of contracted services. If you 
are not willing to accept that sum, $8613.00 
in full satisfaction of sums due, DO NOT 
negotiate the check, for upon your 
negotiation of that check, we will treat the 
matter as fully paid. 
l n 
This language clearly asserts a dispute over billing 
discrepancies, states three times that $8,613 is being tendered 
as full payment, and warns against negotiating the check. What 
more could Mountain Bell say to set up an offer of accord and 
satisfaction? Although the offer was found in Mountain Bell's 
letter, not on the check itself, Estate Landscape admitted 
knowing that the express conditions in the letter related to 
the $8,613 check, which it had received separately but had not 
yet negotiated. A creditor may not disregard the condition 
attached to a check tendered in full payment of a disputed 
claim. Cove View, 758 P.2d at 478 (citing Marton Remodeling, 
706 P.2d at 609). Although the majority mysteriously finds "no 
indication" of Estate Landscape's assent to the offer of 
accord, negotiation of the $8,613 check was itself a conclusive 
manifestation of assent, resulting in an accord and 
satisfaction as a matter of law regardless of its subjective 
intent. See id. 
Estate Landscape negotiated the check, 
the matter. I would reverse. 
That is the end of 
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B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Lowell V. Sunmerhavs - 3154 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
u6G9 South State Street 
P.O. Box 1355 
Sandy, Utah 34091-1355 
Telephone: (801) 942-8008 
David 0. Loreman - 4366 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 520033 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 
Telephone: (801) 261-2887 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW ] 
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC., ] 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE ] 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No.: C85-5197 
) Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly before 
the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, the Plain-
tiff having been represented by Lowell V, Summerhays and David D* 
Loreman, and the Defendant having been represented by Floyd 
Jensen, and upon the trial of this matter having been heard, the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made: 
1 
OCC270 
F ! L £ D JM cLEnis 8 or r ic^ 
S!llt Lake County Utan 
APR-11933 
., ,-v-'- -Vi OiSt. COllf. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that tnere was a contract and that the 
parties were governed by the contract. 
2. The Court finds that the work was not substandard. 
3. The Court finds that tne contract was breached by the 
Plaintiff's failure to submit monthly balance statements, how-
ever, the Court finds that the breach was not material. 
4. The Court finds that the true intent of the parties was 
that the Plaintiff was entitled to bill for each four (4) inches 
of snow removed; the contract was not clear and is ambiguous. 
5. The Court finds that the Bobcat was a front load and 
was within the terms of the contract. The following year the 
Defendant again agreed to its use at $55.00 per hour. 
6. The Court finds that tne Plaintiff was to get authori-
zation for the use of further equipment, and that the dump truck 
was not authorized. 
7. The Court finds that the $10,000.00 limit on the con-
tract was waived by all parties based upon the conduct of all of 
the parties. 
8. The Court finds regarding the issue of damages that 
Defendant has not paid Plaintiff for plowing and the use of the 
front loader costs. 
9. The Court finds that the total bill was $30,162.50, and 
the amount disputed is $21,549.50. The Court finds that the 
amount paid by Mt. Bell on the total bill was $8,613.00. 
2 
QCC2-* 
10. The Court finds that the following dates and amounts 
were not paid by Mt. Bell, and that these amounts do not include 
additional sums for the use of dump trucks. 
DATE AMOUNT 




























TOTAL: $ 10,990.00 
11. The Court finds that interest accrued on the amount due 
and owing from April 16, 1985, at ten percent (10%) compounded 
per annum, until the date this judgment is entered. Thereafter, 
the judgment will run at twelve percent (12%) per annum, at the 




CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Based on the Court's Finding of Facts, it is hereby 
concluded that there was no accord and satisfaction in that the 
Order of Judge Michael R. Murphy delineated the area fully and is 
the law of the case. Even if it were not the law of the case, 
Exhibit 6 introduced into evidence did not fulfill the require-
ments of an accord and satisfaction. 
2. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts, this Court 
concludes that there was a written contract and the theories of 
quantum merit and unjust enrichment do not apply in this case. 
3. The Court also concludes that there were ambiguities in 
the contract and as the contract was drafted by Defendant Mt. 
States Telephone and Telegraph, that the contract must be con-
strued against the party who drafted it. 
4. Based upon the Findings of Fact in this case, it is 
hereby concluded that Defendant is responsible for payment on 
each increment of four (A) inches, and the time charged for the 
Bobcat, and that no dump trucks were allowed based on no prior 
written modifications of the contract to include such dump 
trucks, and therefore, all costs relating to those dump trucks 
are found not to be part of the contract. 
5. IT IS THEREFORE CONCLUDED, based on the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, that Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Special-
ists, Inc. had fulfilled their contract to Mt. States Telephone 
and Telegraph Co., and that there is a sum due and owing to Es-
tate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. in the amount 
4 
000272 
of 310,990.00, plus interest from April 15, 1985, at the rate of 
ten percent (10%) per annum, compounded annually, until the date 
this judgment is entered. Thereafter, interest will he calcula-
ted at twelve percent (125 
DATED this / 
deluding costs of court 
, 1983. 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^J day of 
March, 1988, I caused to be hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to: 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq-
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co, 
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 





Lowell V. Sumfnerhays - 3154 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SU 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4609 Soutn State Street 
P.O. Box 1355 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355 
Telephone: (801) 942-8C08 
David 0. Loreman - 4366 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 520033 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34152 
Telephone: (801) 261-2887 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW ) 4 - \ - & S ~ Q-2>S P " ^ ^ . 
REMOVAL.SPECIALISTS, INC., ) 
a Utah corporation, ) JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, ) 
) Civil No.: C85-5197 
vs. ) 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE ) 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, ) Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly 
before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, the 
Plaintiff having been represented by Lowell V. Summerhays and 
David D. Loreman and the Defendant having been represented by 
Floyd Jensen, and upon the trial of this matter having been 
heard, 
1 
t C \\ 
• • jr ' Saft Lake County Utah 
MMERHAYS APR - 1 1938 
hi DIxcn H'r.£ey. C&:\flrH Qist. Court/ 
/ • ! T ' , : _• . ' . . t.-it: ..'•.•J .<?•«. * 
By _ _ _ _ ^ 
...CVJ/- -+?if:x2'3 '• •:. 
Ccouiy CJorW 
V > U \ J » ^ *• w 
IT IS HEREBY ORnERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 3b 'allows: 
2ased on the Court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law, the Court enters judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and 
against the Defendant in the anount of $10,990,00, plus interest 
at the legal pre-judqinent rate of ten percent (10%) sinple inter-
est per annum, compounded annually since the due date of April 
15, 1985, to the date the judgment is entered. Thereafter, it 
will run at twelve percent (12%) per anpfum at maximum legal rate, 
plus costs, per Rule 54 of the Utah C/5de of Civil Drocedure. 
DATED this /pffAA X 1988. 
By 
nothy R. Hanson 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON H W D L S Y 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^)pL day of 
March, 1988, I caused to be hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT to: 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq. 
Mountain States Telephone 4 Telegraph Co. 
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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D. Summary Decision and Order denying Mountain Bell's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Salt Lake County Utah 
DEC ^0 1936 
H Dixon Htrtdfcy.pef* 3rd Drat Court 
By -SJLJ^^JJLLJI 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW 
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
This Summary Decision and Order is for the purpose of apprising 
the parties and counsel of the grounds for the court's ruling 
and accompanying Order. A more elaborate, extensive and polished 
memorandum decision in this case is not necessary and would 
serve no useful purpose. 
The issue presented is whether, under the undisputed facts 
in this case, there was an accord and satisfaction absolving 
defendant from all claims of the plaintiff for alleged breaches 
of the November 15, 1985 contract for snow removal ("the contract") . 
The discovery, defendant's memorandum of law, and Exhibit "C" 
thereto indicate that the defendant's refusal to pay the full 
amount claimed was premised on its interpretation of Exhibit 
"A" to the contract and specifically paragraph D thereof entitled 
"Rates and Charges." It was defendant's position expressed 
AND ORDER 
CIVIL NO. -erssHsaaa: 
t&srsiil 
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ESTATE LANDSCAPING V. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELE. PAGE TWO SUMMARY DECISION 
in its letter of June 14, 1985 that it would not pay for snow 
removal on the specified dates when weather records indicated 
snow accumulations of less than four inches. No other basis 
for disputing the claims exist in the record before this court 
on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. There is no dispute 
that the amounts tendered were in fact owed in accordance with 
the terms of the contract. 
This case is- controlled by- barton Remodeling v. Jensen, 
706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985). In applying Marton Remodeling to 
the case at bar it is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff's 
original assertions constituted a single claim. In resolving 
this matter, the court cannot artificially bifurcate a single 
dispute in determining whether the purported accord and satisfaction 
extinguished all of plaintiff's claims. Generally, the court 
would be reluctant to suggest that more than one claim exists 
in circumstances where the dispute arises under a single written 
contract. This case, however, is controlled by contrary precedent. 
The Supreme Court in Marton Remodeling set forth two examples 
of circumstances where the dispute involved more than one claim. 
It did so by citing with approval its decisions in Bennett v. Robin-
son's Medical Mart. Inc.. 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966), 
and Dillman v. Massey Ferguson. Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2c 
296 (1962). 
000 
ESTATE LANDSCAPING V. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELE. PAGE THREE SUMMARY DECISION 
In Dillman the parties entered into a contract for the 
termination of a dealership which included a provision whereby 
the defendant was to purchase unused parts. Defendant sorted 
through the parts, accepted some, returned others, and tendered 
a check for only the parts accepted. The Court held that the 
cashing of the checks did not constitute an accord and satisfaction 
as to those parts rejected and returned to plaintiff. Whereas 
the Court in Dillman may have placed some reliance on the language 
of the purported release as being consistent with its ruling, 
the Court in Marton Remodeling expressly distingusihed Dillman 
as a case which "involved two claims.ff 706 P.2d at 609. 
This court cannot distinguish Dillman from the instant 
case. Much like the defendant in Dillman, the defendant here 
accepted some claims and rejected others. As in Dillman, there 
appears to be no dispute as to those claims paid. To paraphrase 
3illman: "The dispute was not as to the amount found due for 
;the services paid] but as to whether [defendant] breached its 
:ontract by refusing to [pay for all services rendered]." 369 
>.2d at 298. As in Dillman, the services paid for by defendant 
rere a liquidated amount for snow removal on the occasions when 
here was no contract dispute concerning accumulation. The 
octrine of accord and satisfaction generally applies only to 
nliquidated claims. See, Calamari & Perillo, Contracts, Sections 
- 1 0 t o - 1 2 (2d Ed. 1 9 7 7 ) . 
000129 
ESTATE LANDSCAPING V. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELE. PAGE FOUR SUMMARY DECISION 
Whereas there are other factors not referenced in this 
Summary Decision and Order supporting denial of summary judgment 
(e.g., intent, consideration, date of acceptance of payment, 
and the reasonable expectations of the parties) , the Dillman 
case, in light of its interpretation and approval in Marton 
Remodeling, alone requires denial of defendant's Motion. 
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
Dated this 29th day of December; 1986. 
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ESTATE LANDSCAPING V. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELE- PAGE FIVE SUMMARY DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Summary Decision and Order, postage prepaid, 
to the following, this Q*'? day of December, 198 6: 
James W. Carter 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Floyd A. Jensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
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HALL, CJ.f DURHAM and ZIMMER-
MAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
MARTON REMODELING, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Mark JENSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
MARTON REMODELING, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark JENSEN, Defendant and 
Respondent 
Nos. 18400, 18401. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 17, 1985. 
^ Builder sued to foreclose on mechan-
*s lien on owner's house and lot for 
$6,538.12 which builder claimed was due 
1. Accord and Satisfaction <§=>11(2) 
Builder's cashing of $5,000 check, con-
taining condition that "[endorsement here-
of constitutes full and final satisfaction," 
where valid dispute existed as to amount 
owing, constituted "accord and satisfac-
tion" that could not be altered by builder's 
addition of "not full payment" below the 
condition. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Accord and Satisfaction e»ll(l) 
Accord and satisfaction of single claim 
is not avoided merely because amount paid 
and accepted is only that which debtor con-
cedes to be due or that debtor's view of 
controversy is adopted in making settle-
ment 
3. Accord and Satisfaction e»ll(2) 
Where bona fide dispute arose as to 
amount owing and check was tendered by 
owner to builder in full payment of unliqui-
dated claim, the builder could not disregard 
the condition attached to check. 
4. Accord and Satisfaction <3=*1 
Common-law rules of accord and satis-
faction are not altered by U.C.A.1953, 70A-
1-207. 
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B. Ray Zoll, Salt Lake City, for Marton 
Peter M. Ennenga, Midvale, for Jensen. 
HOWE, Justice: 
These appeals are from a judgment en-
tered in an action brought by the plaintiff, 
Marton Remodeling, to foreclose a mechan-
ic's lien which it had filed against a house 
and lot owned by the defendant, Mark Jen-
sen, for $6,538.12 which it claimed was due 
it for remodeling. Judgment was entered 
on a jury verdict for $1,538, together with 
$1,000 punitive damages, and attorney fees 
of $5,950.24. The trial court remitted the 
award of punitive damages and reduced the 
attorney fees by 50 percent to $2,976.12. 
Jensen appeals from that judgment in case 
No. 18400, and in case No. 18401, Marton 
appeals, seeking to reinstate the award of 
punitive damages and recover the full 
amount of attorney fees awarded by the 
jury. 
Jensen engaged Marton Remodeling in a 
"time and materials" contract to remodel 
his house. When Marton presented the 
final bill for $6,538.12, Jensen contended 
that the number of hours claimed was ex-
cessive. He offered to pay $5,000 because 
he considered the services were worth that 
amount, but Marton refused the offer. 
Nevertheless, Jensen sent Marton a $5,000 
check with the following condition placed 
thereon: "Endorsement hereof constitutes 
full and final satisfaction of any and all 
claims payee may have against Mark S. 
Jensen, or his property, arising from any 
circumstances existing on the date hereof." 
Marton wrote a letter to Jensen refusing to 
accept the check in full payment and de-
manded the balance. When Jensen made 
no further payment, Marton filed a me-
chanic's lien on Jensen's property and 
cashed the check after writing "not full 
payment" below the condition. This action 
was then brought by Marton to recover the 
$1,538 balance plus punitive damages and 
attorney fees. 
[1] Jensen contends that the trial court 
erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his 
favor because, as a matter of law, Marton's 
cashing of the $5,000 check constituted an 
accord and satisfaction that could not be 
altered by the words added to the condition 
placed thereon by Jensen We agree. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Marton Remodeling, there was 
an accord and satisfaction as we have de-
fined that term in the previous cases decid-
ed by this Court. See Sugarhouse Fi-
nance Co. v. Anderson, Utah, 610 P.2d 
1369 (1980); Tates, Inc. v. Little America 
Refilling Co., Utah, 535 P.2d 1228 (1975); 
Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 
18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966); Ralph 
A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & 
Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669 
(1938): Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 
P.2d 1073 (1935). 
Marton asserts that there was not an 
accord and satisfaction because Marton 
was unquestionably entitled to the $5,000 
represented by the check, and the only 
dispute was whether any further amount 
was owing. He cites Bennett v. Robin-
son's Medical Mart, Inc., supra, in support 
of that reasoning. That reliance is mis-
placed because that case did not involve a 
single claim as in the instant case. In 
Bennett, a salesman who was paid only 
commissions on sales made by him was put 
on a fixed monthly salary by his employer. 
When he terminated his employment two 
months later, he demanded payment of his 
fixed monthly salary then due him plus 
unpaid commissions on sales allegedly 
made by him prior to the change. He also 
sought reimbursement of stock payments. 
His employer gave him a check for the 
amount of the fixed monthly salary then 
due him, which he cashed, bearing the 
statement that it was "payment in full of 
the account stated below—endorsement of 
check by payee is sufficient receipt." This 
Court viewed the salesman as having two 
claims: one for his fixed monthly salary 
which was not in dispute and another claim 
for his commissions about which there was 
a dispute. The amount of the check cover-
ed only the fixed monthly salary and did 
not purport to relate to the claim for com-
missions. We held that the plaintiffs cash-
ing of the check in those circumstances 
could not constitute an accord and satisfac-
tion of the claim for commissions. We 
cited Dilhnan v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 
13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962), which 
also involved two claims, in support of our 
decision. The Alaska Supreme Court in 
Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, Alaska, 673 
P.2d 774 (1983), held that a single claim, 
including both its disputed and undisputed 
elements, is unitary and not subject to divi-
sion so long as the whole claim is unliqui-
dated. 
Marton is not aided by Allen-Howe Spe-
cialties v. U.S. Construction, Inc., Utah, 
611 P.2d 705 (1980). There, the cashing of 
a check representing a progress payment 
on a contract was held not to be an accord 
and satisfaction of all amounts owing up to 
that time. At the time the progress pay-
ment was made, there was no dispute and, 
unlike the instant case, it was not tendered 
as the last payment of the contract where 
finality and settlement is usually sought 
and intended. 
[2] Thus, neither of those cases is dis-
positive here where we are confronted with 
a single unliquidated claim, viz., the bal-
ance owing on a "time and materials" con-
tract. Instead, the general rule applies, 
which is that an accord and satisfaction of 
a single claim is not avoided merely be-
cause the amount paid and accepted is only 
that which the debtor concedes to be due or 
that his view of the controversy is adopted 
in making the settlement. Air Van Lines, 
Inc. v. Buster, supra; North American 
Union v. Montenie, 68 Colo. 220, 189 P. 16 
(1920); Stanley-Thompson Liquor Co. v. 
Southern Colorado Mercantile Co., 65 
Colo. 587, 178 P. 577, 4 A.L.R. 471 (1919); 1 
CJ.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 32 
(1936). Corbin on Contracts § 1289 ap-
proves the rule and states that it is sup-
ported by the greater number of cases, 
citing as good examples Miller v. Prince 
Street Elevator Co., 41 N.M. 330, 68 P.2d 
663 (1937), Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875, 66 
N.W. 834 (1896), and Fuller v. Kemp, 138 
N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 1034 (1893). 
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[3] It is of no legal consequence that 
Marton told Jensen upon receipt of the 
$5,000 check that he did not regard it as 
payment in full. Marton could not dis-
regard with immunity the condition placed 
on the check by Jensen by writing "not full 
payment" under the condition. It is true 
that there is not an automatic accord and 
satisfaction every time a creditor cashes a 
check bearing a "paid in full" notation. 
Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 P. 
412 (1912). An accord and satisfaction re-
quires that there be an unliquidated claim 
or a bona fide dispute over the amount due. 
Ashton v. Skeen, supra. Payment must 
be tendered in full settlement of the entire 
dispute and not in satisfaction of a sepa-
rate undisputed obligation, as in Bennett v. 
Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., supra. 
Payment cannot be given merely as a 
progress payment, as in Allen-Howe v. 
U.S. Construction, Inc., supra. However, 
when a bona fide dispute arises (the exist-
ence of which Marton does not dispute in 
this appeal) and a check is tendered in full 
payment of an unliquidated claim as we 
have here, arising out of a "time and mate-
rials" contract, the creditor may not dis-
regard the condition attached. Corbin on 
Contracts § 1279 explains: 
The fact that the creditor scratches out 
the words "in full payment," or other 
similar words indicating that the pay-
ment is tendered in full satisfaction, does 
not prevent his retention of the money 
from operating as an assent to the dis-
charge. The creditor's action in such 
case is quite inconsistent with his words. 
It may, indeed, be clear that he does not 
in fact assent to the offer made by the 
debtor, so that there is no actual "meet-
ing of the minds." But this is merely 
another illustration of the fact that the 
making of a contract frequently does not 
require such an actual meeting. 
(Footnote omitted.) Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 281 is to the same effect 
and provides the following illustration: 
6. A contracts with B to have repairs 
made on A's house, no price being fixed. 
B sends A a bill for $1,000. A honestly 
disputes this amount and sends a letter 
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explaining that he thinks the amount ex-
cessive and is enclosing a check for S800 
as payment in full B, after reading the 
letter, indorses the check and deposits it 
in his bank for collection. B is bound by 
an accord under which he promises to 
accept payment of the check in satisfac-
tion of A's debt for repairs. The result 
is the same if, before indorsing the 
check, B adds the words "Accepted un-
der protest as part payment" The re-
sult would be different, however, if B's 
claim were liquidated, undisputed and 
matured. 
(Citation omitted.) See Miller v. Prince 
Street Elevator Co., supra, Wilmeth v. 
Lee, Okla., 316 P.2d 614 (1957), and Graf 
fam v. Geronda, Me., 304 A.2d 76 (1973), 
for cases where it was held that a creditor 
cannot avoid the consequences of his exer-
cise of dominion by a declaration that he 
does not assent to the condition attached 
by the debtor. The last cited case succinct-
ly stated the law to be, "The law gave the 
plaintiffs the choice of accepting the check 
on defendant's terms or of returning it." 
[4] Marton contends that under U.C.A., 
1953, § 70A-1-207, it avoided the condition 
placed on the check by Jensen when it 
added the words "not full payment." Mar-
ton asserts that those were words of reser-
vation of rights recognized by section 70A-
1-207. Without deciding whether the 
wording added by Marton could be so inter-
preted, no authority is cited by Marton that 
section 70A-1-207 applies to a "full pay-
ment" check. Of the authorities which we 
have found, the better reasoned hold that 
our section 70A-1-207 (which is identical to 
section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code) does not alter the common law rules 
of accord and satisfaction. See Flambeau 
Products Corp. v. Honeywell Information 
Systems, Inc., 116 Wis.2d 95, 341 N.W.2d 
655 (1984); R.A. Reitker Construction, 
Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Electric Associa-
tion, Colo.App., 680 P.2d 1342 (1984); 
Stultz Electric Works v. Marine Hydrau-
lic Engineering Co., Me., 484 A.2d 1008 
(1984); Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, su-
pra; Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, 
Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or.App. 364, 
664 P.2d 419 (1983); Connecticut Printers. 
Inc. v. Gus K roe sen, Inc., 134 Cal.App.3d 
54, 184 Cal.Rptr. 436 (1982); Milgram 
Food Stores, Inc. v. Gelco Corp., 550 
F.Supp. 992 (W.D.Mo.1982); Pillow v. 
Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, 6 Ark. 
App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982); Eder v. 
Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., Fla.App., 
407 So.2d 312 (1981); Chancellor, Inc. v. 
Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 NJ.Super. 
345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980); Brown v. Coast-
al Trucking, Inc., 44 N.C.App. 454, 261 
S.E.2d 266 (1980); State Department of 
Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash.App. 
671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980); and John v. 
Burns, Wyo., 593 P.2d 828 (1979) (noted 
with approval in Recent Developments in 
Utah Law, 1980 Utah L.Rev. 649, 710); 
Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: 
Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 78 Colum.L.Rev. 48 (1978)). 
Several courts have stated that if they 
were to construe the statute to limit accord 
and satisfaction, it would jeopardize a con-
venient and valuable means of achieving 
informal settlements. Les Schwab Tire 
Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, 
Inc., supra. The law favors compromise in 
order to limit litigation. Accord and satis-
faction serves this goal. Air Van Lines, 
Inc. v. Buster, supra. As stated by Judge 
Corbin in Pillow v. Thermogas Co. of Wal-
nut Ridge, supra, "If we were to decide 
that a creditor can reserve his rights on a 
'payment in full' check, it would seriously 
circumvent what has been universally ac-
cepted in the business community as a con-
venient means for the resolution of dis-
agreements." 
Our determination that there was an ac-
cord and satisfaction obviates the necessity 
of our consideration of any of the other 
points raised in either appeal. The judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed, 
and the case is remanded to the trial court 
to enter judgment in favor of the defend-
ant. Costs on appeal are awarded to de-
fendant. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
STATE v. STAYER 
Cite as 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985) 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
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COVE VIEW EXCAVATING AND 
CONSTRUCTION CO., Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
D. Thomas FLYNN and D. Thomas 
Flynn Construction, Inc., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 870180-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 28, 1988. 
Creditor brought action against debtor 
to recover an unpaid balance of amount 
due on labor and materials supplied by 
creditor. The Tenth Circuit Court, Sevier 
County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment 
against debtor, and debtor appealed. -The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that (1) 
creditor's negotiation of debtor's check, 
which contained handwritten restriction 
that payment was in full for all labor and 
materials owed creditor, resulted in accord 
and satisfaction as matter of law, although 
debtor crossed out restrictive language on 
check before negotiating it, and (2) finding 
that debtor's tender of check containing 
handwritten restriction was payment on on-
going account or progress payment was 
improper. 
Reversed and remanded with; di-: 
rections. 
COVE VIEW EXCAVATING & CONST. 
Cite a* 758 POd 474 (Utah A pp. 1988) 
v. FLYNN Utah 475 
1. Accord and Satisfaction <s=»4, 26(1) 
Elements essential to contracts gener-
ally must be present in accord and satisfac-
tion, including offer and acceptance, and 
meeting of minds; burden of proving every 
necessary element is on party claiming ac-
cord and satisfaction. 
2. Accord and Satisfaction <3=>11(2) 
There is no automatic accord and satis-
faction every time creditor cashes debtor's 
check bearing paid-in-full notation or some 
equivalent language; there must also be 
unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute 
over liquidated amount due creditor. 
3. Appeal and Error <s=>1008.1(5) 
Finding of fact is clearly erroneous if 
it is without adequate evidentiary founda-
tion or if it is induced by erroneous view of 
law. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
4. Appeal and Error <3=>1008.1(5), 1012.-
1(4) 
Reviewing court will not set aside trial 
court's findings unless they are against 
clear weight of evidence or reviewing court 
otherwise reaches definite and firm convic-
tion that mistake has been made. 
5. Appeal and Error <3»842(2) 
Conclusions of law are reviewed on 
appeal for correctness without any defer-
ence to trial court 
6. Accord and Satisfaction <s»ll(2) 
Restrictive language on debtor's check 
to creditor is one evidentiary fact to be 
considered with other evidence, if any, in 
making factual determination of whether 
creditor knew or should have known that 
debtor's payment was tendered as full sat-
isfaction of identified obligation, 
7. Accord and Satisfaction <s=»ll(3) 
Creditor's negotiation of debtor's 
check, which contained handwritten restric-
tion that payment was in full for all labor 
and materials owed creditor, resulted in 
accord and satisfaction as matter of law, 
although creditor crossed out restrictive 
language on check before negotiating it; 
restrictive language on check was clear and 
definite offer to settle entire account with 
creditor, creditor admitted that debtor at-
tempted to present check to satisfy in full 
claims of creditor, creditor knew or reason-
ably should have known from language on 
check that debtor disputed creditor's com-
putation of amount due and was making 
offer of accord and satisfaction, and fact 
that creditor did not subjectively intend to 
accept check as full payment of debtor's 
obligation was legally irrelevant 
8. Accord and Satisfaction <3=>26(3) 
Finding that debtor's tender of check, 
which contained handwritten restriction 
that payment was in full for all labor and 
materials owed creditor, was payment on 
ongoing account or progress payment and 
not offer of accord and satisfaction was 
improper; contract between debtor and 
creditor was not for fixed sum, and creditor 
did not reject tender of final and full pay-
ment under contract 
John Burton Anderson, Kevin Olsen (ar-
gued), Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
appellants. 
Marcus Taylor, Richfield, for plaintiff 
and respondent 




D. Thomas Flynn Construction, Inc. and 
D. Thomas Flynn ("Flynn") appeal from 
the $1,517.50 circuit court judgment en-
tered against them pursuant to an oral 
agreement for the purchase of construction 
materials and the rental of a pump and a 
backhoe. We reverse the judgment and 
remand the case to the trial court for entry 
of judgment in appellants' favor. 
In the spring of 1984, Flynn talked to 
Charles Wayne Grundy ("Grundy")* presi-
dent of respondent Cove View Excavating 
and Construction Company ("Cove View"), 
about a few days' use of Grundy's large 
backhoe.-•;Flynn needed the.equipment to 
complete excavation work he was perform-
ing on a highway project The agreed rent-
al charge was $125 per hour, but no specif-
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ic number of hours was set With Grundy 
as its operator, the backhoe was put to 
work on the job site from May 7 through 
May 15. A large pump Flynn eventually 
needed because of unexpected water prob-
lems on the job was also rented from Grun-
dy at an orally agreed-upon $35 daily 
charge, with no specific number of days 
set. 
On May 25, Grundy sent an invoice to 
Flynn for $5,922.50, including 41.5 hours 
for backhoe rental on May 7, 8, 9, 10 and 
15, seventeen days of pump rental from 
May 8 through May 25, and $140 for pur-
chased construction materials. Flynn disa-
greed with the number of hours billed for 
the backhoe and the number of days billed 
for the pump, which was removed from the 
job site on June 14. According to his time 
records, he only owed Grundy a total of 
$4,060 for materials, pump rental, and 
backhoe rental through June 26. On that 
day, he sent to Cove View a check for 
$5,000 with the following handwritten nota-
tion on the front of the check: "pmt in full 
to date labor & materials." In addition, 
the back of the check contained a handwrit-
ten restriction: "payment in full for all 
labor and materials to 6/26/84." 
On June 27, before receiving the check, 
Grundy sent a second invoice to Flynn that 
included the overdue May invoice amount 
plus twenty more days of pump rental 
(from May 26 through June 14) and pump 
repair costs, for a total of $6,724.56. No 
additional hours were billed for backhoe 
rental On the advice of counsel, Grundy 
crossed out the restrictive language on the 
back of the check and negotiated it He 
thereafter billed Flynn for the unpaid 
$1,724.56 balance and eventually filed this 
suit 
At the bench trial, Flynn produced his 
daily records showing fewer hours of us-
age than claimed by Grundy in his billings. 
Flynn asserted they had agreed he would 
be charged only for the time the backhoe 
was actually in use, as opposed to on the 
job. He also claimed the rental of the 
pump was only for the days of actual use, 
Le., through May 25, not all the days he 
had it in his possession. Grundy contra-
dicted this and testified his billings were 
compiled from his memory and from the 
daily journals in which he recorded how 
many hours the backhoe was on the job. 
According to him, they had agreed Flynn 
was to be billed for the number of days he 
had the pump. The trial court resolved 
these disputed factual matters in favor of 
Cove View, disallowing only the pump re-
pair costs and three days of pump rental 
charges when the pump was broken. 
[1] In support of their motion for sum-
mary judgment at the close of respondent's 
evidence, later denied, appellants had ar-
gued they were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law because, under Marion Re-
modeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 
1985), the parties had reached an accord 
and satisfaction of Cove View's claim. An 
accord and satisfaction arises when the 
parties to a contract agree that a different 
performance, offered in substitution of the 
originally agreed-upon performance, will 
discharge the obligation created under the 
original agreement Golden Key Realty, 
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 
1985); Brimley v. Gasser, 754 P.2d 97, 98 
(Utah App.1988). The elements essential 
to contracts generally must be present in 
an accord and satisfaction, including an 
offer and acceptance and a meeting of the 
minds. Sporv. Crested Butte Silver Min-
ing, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987)/ 
The burden of proving every necessary ele-
ment is on the party claiming an accord and 
satisfaction. Bench v. Bechtel Civil & 
Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460,461 (Utah App. 
1988). 
[2] As the court pointed out in Marion 
Remodeling, there is not an automatic ac-
cord and satisfaction every time a creditor 
cashes a debtor's check bearing a "paid in 
full" notation or some equivalent language,* 
Marion Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 609 (cit-
ing Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 
P. 412 (1912)). There must also be an 
unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute 
over the liquidated amount due the credk 
tor: Id. In such cases, there is sufficient 
consideration to support the accord and 
satisfaction because the person's tender of 
the check on condition that it be accepted 
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as full payment constitutes a surrender of 
the right to dispute the initial obligation. 
See Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 
P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980).1 Because 
there must be an unliquidated or disputed 
claim, it follows that the obligor's tendered 
payment cannot be given merely as a 
"progress payment" on an indivisible con-
tract for a liquidated amount, as in Allen-
Howe Specialties v. U.S. Constr., Inc., 611 
P.2d 705 (Utah 1980). See Marton Remod-
eling, 706 P.2d at 609. 
In his oral ruling from the bench after 
appellants had put on their case, the trial 
judge gave two reasons for rejecting 
Flynn's defense that an accord and satis-
faction of the disputed rental charges had 
taken place when Grundy cashed the June 
26 check. First, the court expressed its 
view that it was not "fair" or "proper" for 
Flynn to raise a dispute regarding the 
hours billed by merely sending the check 
with restrictive language the court conclud-
ed had "no effect" Second, the trial court 
characterized the June 26 check as pay-
ment on an "ongoing account" because 
Flynn still had the pump after the first 
billing was sent. 
Respondent's counsel subsequently 
drafted the sparse written findings and 
conclusions in which neither of these two 
reasons is mentioned. Instead, the conclu-
sion was that no accord and satisfaction 
had been reached solely because, despite 
the restrictive language on the check, 
Grundy had intended to accept the check as 
partial payment of the first invoice, not as 
full payment of Flynn's entire bill. 
[3-5] Under the standard of review set 
forth in Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), a finding of 
fact is clearly erroneous if it is without 
adequate evidentiary foundation or if it is 
induced by an erroneous view of the law. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). We will not set aside the trial 
court's findings unless they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence or we other-
wise reach a definite and firm conviction 
1. Where, however, the underlying claim is liq-
uidated and certain as to amount, separate 
consideration must be found to support the 
accord; otherwise, the obligor binds himsdf 
that a mistake has been made. Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Distr. No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P„2d 1376, 1377 
(Utah 1987). Conclusions of law, however, 
are simply reviewed on appeal for correct-
ness without any deference to the trial 
court. Id. at 1378. 
On appeal, appellants assert (1) the evi-
dence does not support the findings that 
the claim at issue here was undisputed and 
that Flynn's payment was on an ongoing 
account; and (2) the trial court erroneously 
interpreted and applied the law of accord 
and satisfaction. They contend the limita-
tion on the check was itself a clear indica-
tion of dispute and an offer of full payment 
of Flynn's account through June 26—for 
less than the amount Grundy claimed was 
due through that date—which Grundy ac-
cepted by cashing the check, notwithstand-
ing his actual intent We agree. 
The trial court apparently determined 
this was not a disputed claim because there 
were no discussions or correspondence to 
that effect between the parties prior to or 
contemporaneous with the check itself. 
However, there is no legal support for the 
proposition that restrictive language on the 
tendered check is alone insufficient to cre-
ate the dispute required for an accord and 
satisfaction. In Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 
2d 275, 437 P.2d 202, 207 (1968), the Utah 
Supreme Court suggested that restrictive 
wording accompanying a tender of full pay-
ment could be a sufficient expression of the 
debtor's intention that it only be accepted 
as full payment of the pending claim. 
[6] The restrictive language is merely 
one evidentiary fact to be considered with 
other evidence, if any, in making the factu-
al determination of whether the creditor 
knew or should have known that the pay-
ment was tendered as full satisfaction of 
an identified obligation of the debtor. 6 A. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1277 
(1962). See Rivervalley Co. v. Deposit 
Guaranty Nat'l Bank, 331 RSupp. 698, 
708-09 (N.D.Miss.1971) (applying Mississip-
to do nothing he was not already obligated to 
. do, and the obligee's promise to accept a sub-
* stitute performance is unenforceable. * _ 
Sugarhouse fuu Co., 610 ?2d at 1372. 
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pi law). See generally Annotation, Accord 
and Satisfaction—Check Acceptance, 42 
A.L.R.4th 12 (1985). 
[7] Despite the fact that Flynn had not 
yet received Cove View's second invoice 
when he sent the check, the language on 
the front and back is a clear and definite 
offer to settle his entire account through 
June 26 for less than Cove View was claim-
ing as due through that date. This open-
ended, oral equipment rental agreement for 
unspecified total time periods was—by its 
very nature—likely to lead to differing tal-
lies of the hours and days to be billed. 
Flynn did not have possession of Cove 
View's equipment after June 15. The June 
26 check was for almost $1,000 less than 
what Cove View claimed on its first invoice. 
Grundy did not contend he misunderstood 
Flynn's intent in sending the check or the 
meaning of the limiting words. Indeed, 
during pretrial discovery he admitted that 
"Defendants attempted to present said 
check to satisfy in full the claims of Plain-
tiff " Grundy did not just take the 
check and deposit it without concern for 
the notations on it. He waited and sought 
the advice of his attorney, who told him to 
cross out the restrictive endorsement and 
negotiate the check. Grundy knew or rea-
sonably should have known—from the na-
ture of the rental agreement itself and 
from the language on the check—that 
Flynn disputed Cove View's computation of 
the total number of hours of equipment 
rental and was making an offer of accord 
and satisfaction. The trial court's finding 
to the contrary is clearly erroneous. 
In light of the express condition on the 
check, the fact that Grundy did not subjec-
tively intend to accept the check as full 
payment of Flynn's obligation is legally 
irrelevant A creditor may not disregard 
the condition attached to a check tendered 
in full payment of an unliquidated or dis-
puted claim. Marton Remodeling, 706 
P.2d at 609.* Grundy's options were to 
2. See Pino v. Lopez, 361 So.2d 192 (Fia^pp. 
1978) (accord and satisfaction found where 
creditor accepted check with notation "Full and 
final payment for all goods, services and claims 
to date"), cert dismissed, 365 So.2d 714 (Fla. 
1978); Young v. Proctor, 119 GaApp. 165, 166 
accept the check on Flynn's terms or return 
it. See id. at 610. See also Air Van 
Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 778 
(Alaska 1983); Graff am v. Geronda, 304 
A.2d 76, 80 (Me.1973). His negotiation of 
Flynn's check was an acceptance of Flynn's 
offer of full payment, notwithstanding his 
lack of any actual intent to accept it as 
such. 
The fact that the creditor scratches out 
the words "in full payment," or other 
similar words indicating that the pay-
ment is tendered in full satisfaction, does 
not prevent his retention of the money 
from operating as an assent to the dis-
charge It may, indeed, be clear that^  
he does not in fact assent to the offer 
made by the debtor, so that there is no 
actual "meeting of the minds." But this* 
is merely another illustration of the fact 
that the making of a contract frequently 
does not require such an actual meeting.-
6 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1279 
(1962) (quoted with approval in Marton Re-
modeling, 706 P.2d at 609). See Spot, 740. 
P.2d at 1308 (acceptance of an offer to 
rescind a contract may be inferred from a 
party's conduct). The trial court thus in-
correctly concluded that respondent could 
cross out and thereby vitiate the restric-
tions on Flynn's check. 
In explaining from the bench his ruling 
that there was no accord and satisfaction, 
the trial judge stated this was an "ongoing 
account," the significance of which is not 
set forth. For reasons that are not appar-
ent in the record, this finding does not 
reappear in the written findings of fact and. 
conclusions of law. It could be construed 
as another way of saying, as the written 
findings and conclusions suggest, that 
Grundy accepted the check only with the 
actual intent to apply it as partial payment 
of Flynn's bilL However, Grundy's negoti-
ation of this check resulted in an accord 
and satisfaction as a matter of law regard-
less of his subjective intent 
SJE^d 423 (1969) (restrictive endorsement for 
"all bookkeeping & accounting services to 
date*); Graffam v. Geronda, 304 A2d 76 (Me. 
1973) ("Full and final payment for product re-
ceived December 18, 1969"). 
COVE VIEW EXCAVAT 
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[8] On the other hand, a careful reading 
of the trial transcript (particularly the legal 
arguments of respondent's counsel) strong-
ly suggests that, by finding an ongoing 
account, the court was equating Flynn's 
check with the "progress payment" in Al-
len-Howe Specialties, 611 P.2d at 710. As 
such, it is clearly erroneous. 
In Allen-Howe Specialties, the parties 
entered into an indivisible written construc-
tion contract for a liquidated amount, Le., 
$53,372. In accordance with its terms, the 
defendant made regular partial payments 
to the plaintiff as work progressed. Re-
strictive language on the back of each 
check stated its endorsement acknowledged 
payment in full for all labor, equipment and 
materials furnished to date by the payee. 
Plaintiff refused the tender of the last pay-
ment under the contract and filed suit to 
recover sums, in addition to those in the 
written contract, for extra work performed 
The court rejected defendant's argument 
that negotiation of the progress payment 
checks constituted an accord and satisfac-
tion of all claims for extra work incurred 
during the time periods for which the ac-
cepted progress payments were made. Id. 
at 710-11. 
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In marked contrast, the contract between 
Flynn and Cove View was not for a fixed 
sum. It was for an undetermined number 
of hours and days of rental that were un-
disputedly over when Flynn sent his check; 
the parties simply disagreed over the total 
amount to be paid. Unlike the plaintiff in 
Allen-Howe Specialties, Grundy did not 
reject the tender of final and full payment 
under the contract Instead, he accepted a 
check with an express condition that it was 
offered as "payment in full for all labor 
and materials to 6/26/84/' resulting in an 
accord and satisfaction of all Cove View's 
claims through that date. 
The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed and the case is remanded for entry 
of judgment in appellants' favor. Costs to 
appellants. 
BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
